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Abstract: In this paper I undertake to examine Ruth Macklin’s claim that dignity 
is a useless concept. I explain her contention by the fact that dignity, as a concept, has 
a long history and has been presented differently at different times. I shed some light 
on certain different conceptions of dignity in ancient times and in our contemporary 
era. And I end up with the suggestion that the term “dignified”, like “good”, is a pri-
marily evaluative term, unlike what some philosophers have thought. 
Keywords: Dignity; autonomy; human rights; primarily and secondarily evalua-
tive terms
In a short article under the title, “Dignity is a useless concept” the American 
bioethicist Ruth Macklin puts forward the claim that, contrary to what is usually 
thought, dignity is a useless concept and that all appeals to it are “either vague restate-
ments of other, more precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to an under-
standing of the topic”1. In a positive formulation of her contention she argues that 
dignity “means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy”2.  According to 
the American bioethicist therefore, dignity is either an empty concept which means 
nothing or a mere restatement of more precise concepts such as respect for persons 
or for their autonomy. As it stands, that is to say, dignity means nothing at all. It has 
therefore either no or very little use in discussions in bioethics. 
John Harris, the British bioethicist, seems to argue in somewhat the same spirit, 
when he examines whether the technology of cloning affects human dignity in any 
way3.
One reason which explains the confusion that surrounds this concept is that dig-
nity has been used since antiquity in a number of contexts and has acquired differ-
ent kinds of meanings. The concept of dignity can be traced back to the ancient 
philosophical texts, in particular in the works of Plato and Aristotle, in the Roman 
writers and philosophers, notably in Cicero, and later on in the texts of the Christian 
religion4. It can also be detected in civilizations which are older than the ancient 
Greek, like for instance the Chinese5. As Andorno points out, even though dignity 
is a concept of the Western civilization, nevertheless it has its correlates in the Con-
fucian philosophy and thought6. As he puts it, “Confucianism has given substantive 
content to the notion of dignity in classic Chinese philosophy by establishing the 
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moral ideals of humanity (Ren) and righteousness (Yi), as exemplified in the moral 
character of the Confucian gentleman (jünzi), the prototype of the virtuous man”7. It 
was further analyzed and developed by the two famous writers of the Italian Renais-
sance, Giannozzo Manetti and Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola. The latter composed 
the treatise, Oratio Elegantissima de Dignitate Hominis, which has remained as one of 
the classical writings on dignity8.
However, it reached the peak of its development in Europe in modern times 
under the influence of Descartes’ metaphysics and Kant’s ethical thought. In the 
contemporary era, bioethicists have been studying it further in an attempt they make 
to bring out its relationship with autonomy and human rights not only in the con-
text of political authority but also in the context of bioethics in which autonomy and 
human rights may be often put at risk by various medical practices and technologies. 
In this way the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was issued 
in 1948, gives a pre-eminent place to human dignity, when it writes at the very 
beginning of its Preamble: Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world9.
In a similar manner, the Universal Declaration in Bioethics and Human Rights 
issued by Unesco in 2005 considers human dignity and human rights as its superior 
principles, when it states: Human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are to be fully respected10.
Furthermore, human dignity and human rights constitute its main aim the pro-
motion of which the Declaration has undertaken to realize11.
Before we proceed to refute Macklin’s contention we mentioned above, a couple 
of distinctions are apposite at this place. First, we must distinguish between dignity 
as is normally understood nowadays and the concept of dignity as was employed in 
the Roman times and in Cicero’s writings. The Roman equivalent to dignity dignitas, 
dignitatis is the honor we attribute to someone, usually a general, an official or an 
important person, when he has excelled in bravery during the war or in some other 
feat. In this case, dignity is something which is awarded to someone and which he 
cannot acquire by himself. Dignity, on the other hand, as is traditionally understood 
and as is conceived in the contemporary era, is something we possess inherently by 
the mere fact that we are born human, and nobody else, apart from ourselves, can 
either deprive us of it or help us develop it. Dignity, as we conceive the concept in 
the modern era, is an inherent ability or predisposition which we will either develop 
ourselves or contribute to its elimination.
Secondly, we must distinguish between the two different ways in which dignity has 
been used throughout the centuries. As Ludwig Siep points out, we must distinguish 
between a transcendental and an inherent foundation of dignity12. The former can be 
traced back to the classical Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle and the Christian 
tradition. According to Siep, it was the Platonic dualism that contributed mostly 
to this conception of dignity13. According to Plato, man participates through the 
intellectual part of his soul in the world of Ideas which is also the sphere of gods14. 
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The value of this immaterial and intellectual part of man is undoubtedly bigger than 
the value of the material world. Man’s dignity depends on the extent to which man 
succeeds in promoting this intellectual part of his self, despite the fetters that imposes 
on him his natural constitution15.
Aristotle does not agree with Plato’s dualism nor with his contention that we 
participate in the mortal world as well as in the world of gods. Even so, however, 
Aristotle holds that all human beings share with gods the intellectual activity of their 
soul16. Even though this activity cannot safeguard man’s immortality, nevertheless to 
the extent that it renders man divine, like god, is a source of value, the root of man’s 
dignity17.
But Siep also detects a second conception of dignity in Aristotle’s work. It is the 
kind of psychophysical state man acquires, when his practical reason succeeds in con-
trolling and guiding his desires and passions18. This is the kind of dignity one achieves 
after the unceasing exercise of one’s practical reason over one’s passions. Whereas the 
previous one is the kind of dignity one achieves through the intellectual activity of 
one’s soul which likens one with gods. 
It is interesting to notice at this point that, according to Siep, Aristotle conceives 
of dignity either as an intellectual activity in which only gods and very few exception-
al men engage or as an exercise of practical reason with which only the virtuous men 
are occupied. Consequently, according to Siep’s interpretation, Aristotle’s eudaimon 
(εὐδαίμων) character is the man who possesses dignity in one way or another. 
The conception of dignity is further enhanced, according to Siep, by the influence 
of the Christian religion. In addition to his intellectual aspect which he shares with 
God, man also shares with him his inexhaustible love for the weak and the poor19. 
This fusion of Aristotelian philosophy with Christian thought brought out in the Eu-
ropean civilization, according to Siep, two values of great importance: the Christian 
virtue of philanthropy and the notion of social care20.
Along with the transcendental conception of dignity, we have the inherent con-
ception of it. If the man of classical antiquity, according to Siep, had dignity because 
he could transcend his material self and reach gods, the man of modernity is focused 
on his bodily, finite existence and does not need any intellectual or divine support. 
By virtue of the theoretical use of reason he can acquire knowledge, whereas by virtue 
of the practical use of reason he can submit his ends to scrutiny and behave moral-
ly21. On this view, acquiring theoretical knowledge and acting in accordance with 
the categorical imperative of practical reason is what gives man value and dignity. 
For man now is not controlled by God’s commandments but by his practical reason 
which prescribes him to foster and promote the ends of others as if they are his own. 
As Kant puts it: A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when 
he gives universal laws in it but is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it 
as a sovereign when as lawgiving, he is not subject to the will of any other22.
Of course, it would be a mistake if we argued that these two conceptions of dig-
nity which Siep has distinguished are so clear-cut and that the former was exclusively 
developed in antiquity, whereas the latter is a creation of modern times. In his short 
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review article entitled “Making sense of dignity”, Richard Ashcroft distinguishes in 
our contemporary era four conceptions of dignity23. The first group of philosophers 
considers all “dignity-talk” as useless and incoherent. Among these philosophers he 
includes Ruth Macklin and almost all the English speaking bioethicists. The second 
group of philosophers considers the concept of dignity as having family resemblances 
with the concepts of capabilities and functionings24. This approach has been devel-
oped by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. The third group considers the concept 
of dignity illuminating but it is strictly reducible to autonomy. This is the approach 
put forward by Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword25. And the fourth group 
of philosophers claims that dignity is a metaphysical property which is “possessed by 
all and only human beings, and which serves as a foundation for moral philosophy 
and human rights”26. This view is mainly represented by the works of the American 
bioethicist Leon Kass. 
Ashcroft believes in a way that both Beyleveld and Brownsword’s approach on 
the one hand Kass’ approach on the other constitute a very good answer to Macklin’s 
claim that dignity is a useless concept. Even though Beyleveld and Brownsword tend 
to agree with her that dignity is grounded in autonomy, nevertheless they go much 
further than this. They argue that dignity obliges us to respect even those who have 
lost their autonomy or they may never regain it again, on the grounds that we have 
duties and obligations towards those who are fragile and vulnerable27. This precisely 
shows that dignity is not reducible to autonomy, it is something more and above it, 
since it obliges us to treat morally those who lack autonomy. 
Similarly, Ashcroft claims that Kass’ metaphysical conception of dignity has many 
problems. One of the main weaknesses he finds is that dignity is taken by Kass to be 
a primitive concept28. But, as he points out, if dignity grounds morality and all moral 
values, then we need an account of dignity which explains the relationship between 
dignity and the other moral values, the relation between dignity and its physical em-
bodiment etc., an account which Kass obviously does not supply29.
But in criticizing Kass’ conception of dignity, Ashcroft shows us the right way of 
understanding dignity. If dignity is not a metaphysical property which is possessed by 
all human beings, as Kass claims, then one sensibly wonders how else we can conceive 
of it. Of course, Ashcroft argues that another approach is to think that dignity is a 
“thick” concept, that is to say a concept that combines descriptive with evaluative 
meaning30. Ashcroft compares the term “dignified” with “rude”. He could also have 
compared it with terms such as “industrious”, “courageous”, “generous” etc..31 In 
the case of rude and the other terms we have fairly fixed standards in our society as 
to what constitutes rudeness, industry, courage, generosity. As a consequence, such 
terms have firmly attached their descriptive meaning to them; their evaluative mean-
ing is only secondary32.
The question I wish to ask is this: Is the meaning of the term “dignified” more like 
the meaning of the terms “rude”, “industrious” etc. or is it more like the meaning of 
the term “good”? As mentioned, terms like “rude”, “industrious” etc. have their de-
scriptive meaning firmly attached to them, this is why they evaluate only in a second-
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ary manner. The term “good”, on the other hand, is a primarily evaluative term33. It is 
used primarily to evaluate and only secondarily to describe. This is why its descriptive 
meaning is never fully fixed. As Hare puts it: Although the evaluative meaning of 
“good” is primary, the secondary descriptive meaning is never wholly absent34.
In fact, the descriptive meaning of the term “good” has to be defined anew each 
time it is used. To mention Hare’s examples, if I talk of “a good egg”, then it is fairly 
clear to which kind of egg I am referring, and which I evaluate as good. If, on the 
other hand, I talk of “a good poem”, the description I am referring to may not be so 
easy to define35. What remains, however, steady is the evaluative meaning of the term 
“good” which evaluates whatever the standard of good poetry is which I adopt.
I wish to argue that the logic of the term “dignified” is more like the logic of the 
term “good” than that of the secondarily evaluative terms. The term “dignified” does 
not have any fixed descriptive meaning, it is primarily an evaluative term. Its descrip-
tive meaning is defined from the beginning each time it is attributed to someone. So 
if I talk of “a dignified public servant”, I understand very well the kind of description 
I am referring to, that is the public servant that is in his office the precise hours, that 
performs his expected duties conscientiously, that is never bribed, and has good man-
ners. In the same way that if I talk of “a dignified father” or of “a dignified citizen”, 
I understand fully the kind of description I am referring to. But in all these cases, 
whatever the particular description is which I adopt, when I use the term “dignified”, 
I evaluate the persons in question positively. In this sense, the term “dignified”, like 
the term “good”, is a primarily evaluative term. 
This lack of specific descriptive meaning that characterizes the primarily evalu-
ative terms has obviously led philosophers, like Macklin and Harris, to argue that 
dignity is a useless and meaningless concept. (In a way they remind us of the Logical 
Positivists and of their project that moral language is meaningless). Would these phi-
losophers argue in the same way about good? Would they also argue that “good” is a 
useless concept? I just wonder. If they also argued that “good”, like “dignified”, is a 
useless and meaningless concept, then they evidently have an impoverished concep-
tual scheme, a scheme that lacks completely evaluative terms. This translated in real 
terms would mean that in their cosmology and theories of knowledge values have no 
place. If this is the case, then this would be indeed something deplorable, something 
which they will have to think about again. 
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